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**BIN 'ABD AL-KARIM AL-KHATTABI
IN THE RIFI ORAL TRADITION
OF GZENNEYA**

Mohamed Chtatou

Like most pre-literate societies, the Berbers have a rich and remarkably intricate form of oral tradition. Handicapped by the lack of an alphabet for their language, with the sole exception of the Tuaregs who use *Tifinagh* as a script form, and by widespread illiteracy, the Berbers resorted to the spoken word and to memory in order to record their history and traditions and pass them from generation to generation unhindered by time. As their society and way of life grew more sophisticated, this oral tradition expanded and improved both in quality and quantity in order to cope with the changes in their cultural needs. Oral tradition, then, has two important functions in Berber society.

In the first place it serves as a repository of their history. Certainly it can be argued that oral transmission of historical facts is prone to distortion. But thousands of years before the writing of history became professionalised and institutionalised, pre-literate amateur historians were at work collecting material of historical importance and preserving it for the coming generations.

Secondly, oral tradition is a means of literary expression, and unlike the historic texts of a literate society, is at the disposal of any member of the society without cultural discrimination.

This paper will examine how the oral tradition of the tribe of Gzennaya reported the rise of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim to pre-eminence in the Rif and the different literary genres that were used to record the war he waged against the Spaniards between 1921 and 1926. The texts will be examined both as oral history and as oral literature in a historical context.

As oral history, the texts will be analysed to see what light they throw on the circumstances in which bin 'Abd al-Karim managed, by his charisma and intelligence, to dominate the political scene in the Rif. It will look at explanations of his success in changing Rifi society as a whole, and the society of Gzennaya in particular, sometimes by persuasion and sometimes by sheer use of force. It will discuss how he was able to put an end to feuding, and the military and political structure he set up in place of the archaic and deficient tribal system at the local level.

As oral literature, a corpus of texts will be presented and commented upon: both *izran*, rhymed couplets, and *raqsiyyat* (*r̥d̥qsiyy̥θ̥* in Berber), long epic poems celebrating bin 'Abd al-Karim's *jihad* and his victories at Annoual and Dhar Aberran over the invading Spaniards. It will be argued that this oral literature cannot be seen simply as a form of a literary creation, but must also be understood as powerful propaganda that strengthened the hand of the Amir in Gzennaya and in the Rif as a whole, and won him badly-needed support: recruits for his regular army as well as for the local *harkas*.

I. THE BACKGROUND

Apart from a few periods when the Sultan sent powerful *harkas*¹ to punish the Rifis for their support of some pretender, the Rif always had the status of *Bilad al-Siba* ("land of dissidence"),² and thus escaped the grip of the Makhzan, the central government. However, dissidence never meant chaos or lack of government, because in each tribe political and military power was held by the council of *ašt ābein*,³ which at times delegated some of its

¹ A *harka* was an army of irregulars raised in a particular area or tribe by the Makhzan to punish dissidents, rebels or tribes not willing to pay taxes to the central government.

² Because the Makhzan became much weaker in the second half of the nineteenth century many tribes rebelled and refused to pay taxes or accept the *caids* appointed by the Makhzan on their territory, thus joining the *Bilad as-Siba* ('land of dissidence') and leaving the *Bilad al-Makhzan* (the areas under the control of the central government). Cf. David M. Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, An Ethnography and History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 7-8 and David Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif, Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (London and Stanford: Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press, 1969), 4-5.

³ *ašt ābein* is the council of the elders of a Rifi tribe that used to act as the law-making body. It is made up of a number of clan leaders respected for their age and wisdom but not necessarily, as some anthropologists believe, of 40 people. This belief is based on confusion of *ābein* with the Arabic *arba'in* which does mean 'forty.'

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prerogatives to the confederation or the "nomenklatura" of the *leff*.⁴

The era of the "*ripublik*"

Because there was no strong centralised Makhzan, feuding always existed. But it was always kept under strict control and obeyed certain rules, out of a strong sense of self-preservation. Feuding sometimes began not because of political problems but as a result of simple vendettas which were undertaken to preserve personal honour: these always ended with the payment of blood money and the newly-born peace pact would be cemented, either with a wedding, or merely with a big feast.

Nevertheless, towards the turn of the nineteenth century feuding did get out of control. The Makhzan became even weaker after Mawlay 'Abd al-'Aziz, then a boy who was still in his teens, was proclaimed as Sultan in Marrakech.⁵ Strife spread like wildfire through the Rif. This period of almost total chaos was known as the era of the *ripublik*⁶: it was as though the Rif, which until then had supposedly been under the tight control of the Sultan, had suddenly broken free and declared its independence and opted for a republican form of government instead of the monarchy.

The *ripublik* was a propitious time to settle scores between individuals, families, clans, tribes and *leffs* in a way which was a dramatic illustration of the famous saying:

⁴ *Leff* is an alliance of a number of tribes against a particular tribe or tribes - see Woolman, 22, 27-29) and David M. Hart, *Emilio Blanco Izaga, Colonel in the Rif*, 2 Vols. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1975), 248-55.

⁵ On the death of Mawlay Hasan in 1894, Mawlay 'Abd al-'Aziz, his favourite son who was then 14 years old, was proclaimed Sultan by his father's *hajib*, chamberlain, the overpowerful Ahmad ibn Musa. This man, known as Ba Ahmad, acted as a regent until he died in the cholera epidemic of 1900. See Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of Morocco* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1983), 62 and Charles-André Julien, *Le Maroc face aux imperialismes, (1415-1956)* (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1982), 37-76.

⁶ The era of the *ripublik* lasted from 1898 to 1921; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 355-68.

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend"
(rðɛðu ðnğðɛðu inu ðammddukðr inu)⁷

The oral literature is rich in stories and songs depicting the harshness of everyday life during this period of Rifi history. Nowadays, people look back on it as the time of naked savageness, violence and brutality.

The *ripublik* opened the way to Spanish colonialism which had been waiting for a second chance in Morocco. Since the Moroccan-Spanish War of 1860,⁸ Spain had made no substantial gains, political or economic. Weakened by infighting, some tribes in the Rif sided enthusiastically with the enemy in the hopes of gaining an advantage from the alliance which would allow them to crush their opponents. But the Spanish, like the French elsewhere in Morocco, wanted no winners or losers in this feuding: they simply hoped to weaken the tribes, so that they would pose no resistance to the progressive advance of their troops. From sheer political opportunism, Spain even fuelled the feuding in areas it did not control by providing funds, weapons and ammunition to the adversaries.

At various times the local saints tried to stop the carnage, but in vain. That would be the task of a man who, until 1912, was quite unknown. He was Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, a judge and a contributor to a newspaper in the Spanish enclave of Melilla.

Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim

Muhammad bin 'Abd-al-Karim was born in 1866 in the small village of Ajdir overlooking the bay of Al Hoceima. He was a member of the clan of Aith Khattab of the tribe of Aith Waryaghar

⁷ This is a phonetic transcription from Berber.

⁸ As a result of a capture of a Spanish ship by Moroccan "pirates" in 1858 and fighting around Ceuta in 1859, Spain found an excuse to invade Morocco in 1860 and advance on Tétouan. The Moroccan army, led by the Sultan's brother Mawlay al-'Abbas, provided little opposition - C.R. Pennell, *A Country with a Government and a Flag, The Rif War in Morocco 1921-1926* (Wisbech: Menas Press, 1986), 9.

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(Banu Wayriaghal in Arabic), hence his family name of al-Khattabi. However, it is widely believed in the Aith Waryaghar that bin 'Abd al-Karim could trace his ancestry back to the Prophet Muhammad and that he chose the name al-Khattabi because it was the name of the most revered Caliph, 'Umar al-Khattab,⁹ who spread Islam east and west and was known for his justice, his charisma and his courage in fighting in the name of Islam.

As a young man Muhammad and his brother M'hammad were sent by their father to Melilla to study in 1906. Between 1906 and 1919, he took up different professions: he taught in a Spanish school, worked as an interpreter and as a clerk in the Oficina de Asuntos Indígenas (Bureau of Indigenous Affairs), and as a journalist on *El Telegrama del Rif*, published in Melilla with a section in Arabic. In 1910 he was appointed Qadi of Melilla, and from 1913 onwards as *Qadi Qudat* (Supreme Qadi) of the Kart region.¹⁰ At this stage, Ibrahim Kridia¹¹ argues, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim was a fervent admirer of Spain to which he rendered various services; as a result he received substantial financial rewards, was given a great deal of power, and was decorated with various titles and medals, such as the Medal of Military Merit in March 1912, which made him eligible for a pension. He was awarded the Medal of Africa in October of the same year. However, his flirtation with the Spanish did not last much longer. He soon discovered that the colonial power's intentions in controlling the Rif were not to modernise the country by educating its people, building its infrastructure and straightening up its economy to make Morocco solvent. Instead, the Spanish wanted to have an easy access to its hinterland and its riches and were prepared to make all kinds of promises in order to subdue the people. What was really at stake was Spain's reputation as a civilised and modern European nation, especially *vis-à-vis* its powerful neighbour, France.

⁹ Germain Ayache, *Les origines de la guerre du Rif* (Paris and Rabat: Les Editions de la Sorbonne and S.M.E.R., 1982), 158.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹¹ Ibrahim Kridia, *Ma'rakat Anwal wa-nataijuha* (Casablanca: S.I.E., 1986), 36

II. BIN 'ABD AL-KARIM IN ORAL HISTORY

Against the background of the tribal differences, belligerence and sheer egoism that always stopped the Rifis from uniting, bin 'Abd al-Karim stands out as one of the few figures in Moroccan history who was able to bring all these people together. His charisma and sense of leadership played such an important role in changing the course of Rifi history, that he is remembered today as the descendant of the prophet who brought the *baraka*¹² to the Rif.

Baraka

When a man is said to have *baraka*, this raises him to the status of a saint, gives him the respectability of a sharif, and confers on him both spiritual and temporal powers. Bin 'Abd al-Karim was never considered a saint in the folkloric sense, a man with a divine power to heal the sick, make sterile women fertile, and so on.¹³ His *baraka* was the gift of leadership, his ability to unite the most disparate tribes under the same banner and galvanise them into taking on a powerful European nation and bringing it to its knees, thus opening the way to the decolonisation of the Third World by force of arms.

All the qualities attributed to bin 'Abd al-Karim were the natural consequence of his God-given *baraka*: his ability to unite the tribes, stop the feuding, organise local government, introduce social reforms, raise taxes, build roads, train a regular army and most of all, defeat the better trained and better equipped "infidel" army.

One of my informants, Si Bennaceur Ben Abdeslam (who was 68 years old when I interviewed him in 1986), was a professional *fqih* from the Iharassen clan of Gzennaya. He said

¹² A translation of *baraka* would be "divine blessing." Pennell says that *baraka* is "founded on a reputation for piety or learning or some semi-miraculous power, and can be preserved after a man's death in his tomb, which then becomes an object of pilgrimage and can sometimes be passed down to his descendants." (*A Country with a Government and a Flag*, 28)

¹³ Edward Alexander Westermarck, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, 2 Vols. (New York: University Books, 1968) Vol. 1, Chapters 1-3.

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that some *fqihs* from the clan of Aith Khattab had told him that on the day when bin 'Abd al-Karim was born, a swarm of snow-white pigeons descended in beautiful formations from the heavens and flew in a circle over the house of his father, 'Abd al-Karim, for over an hour until a scream announcing the birth of the baby was heard. Then the pigeons soared into the sky and disappeared as though they had entered another dimension. Later, in the evening of the same day, people watching from the vantage points around the house saw, against the background of the dark sky, an aura in the place where the pigeons had flown in a circle. This aura was seen throughout the night for the next seven days, that is until the day the baby boy was given his name, Muhammad.

On the naming-day itself, it proved so difficult to kill the sheep at the beginning of the ceremony, that the *fqihs* had to attempt it seven times, with seven different brand new sharp knives, before the throat of the ram was cut and blood gushed out. For forty days, Si Bennaceur Ben Abdeslam says, the whole clan of Aith Khattab was bathed in the fragrance of musk during the day and honeysuckle at night. This is an event that really only happens once in a decade when *ṣawwath uẓannā* the gate of heaven, opens on the Night of Destiny (the 26th of the holy month of Ramadan.) It was obvious to the Aith Khattab in particular, and the Rifis in general, that this child would be very important and would undoubtedly change the history of the Rif. He was born a *amẓahād*, a fighter in holy war, who would show the Islamic Umma the importance of *jihād*.

Another informant saw things differently. Hajj Beqqich, (aged 97 in 1986), from Ihkwanen and living and working as a muezzin in the village of Ajdir in the Gzennaya tribe, considered that the *baraka* of bin 'Abd al-Karim was more worldly than heavenly. It was manifested through his political flair, his sense of administrative, financial and military organisation, his knowledge of local politics, and his sense of timing. Bin 'Abd al-Karim was a politician, a military leader, an administrator, an economist, a diplomat and a religious leader. This explains why he was only given the title of *amir*, not that of *amir al-mu'minin*, the Commander of the Faithful, which was reserved exclusively to the Sultan.

One of the clearest manifestations of his *baraka* was seen in his ability to control a society on the brink of chaos and mass-suicide and direct its negative instincts into the positive enterprise

of nation-building. Rifi society at the time was backward and prone to violence, but very quickly bin 'Abd al-Karim won the sympathy and admiration of the world for his military exploits. His successful program of social reforms, his emphasis on social justice, and the application of the *shari'a*, also brought him admiration and respect. He was as just as the Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim began his political program by setting up a model administration and raising a well regimented army first within the bounds of his clan and then in neighbouring tribes. His organisational ability won over many clans and tribes and others followed as a domino effect. Alliances were sealed by a local *bay'a*, or oath of allegiance, and once a clan or tribe had joined him, bin 'Abd al-Karim would imprison those of its leaders who were corrupt and appoint younger and more competent administrators. They, in turn, established a local administration and enrolled those who had engaged in local feuding into a modern army with a uniform and a monthly pay.

But the regular army was not big enough to fight the war against the Spanish, so local militias were created; in time of peace it helped the army keep order and in time of war it relieve the army at the front. These militia forces were called *harka* and each tribe had its own.¹⁴ At the beginning of the Rif war, battles on all the fronts were fought with *harkas* raised in different tribes.

Haji Omar Ben Si Slimane (70 years old), a retired soldier, told me that he thought bin 'Abd al-Karim's greatest achievements were to bring peace to the Rif after so many years of disorder and to introduce social and economic reforms. He described how, in the old days, getting married was synonymous with financial hardship, because the groom not only had to pay a high dowry and buy gifts to the bride but he also had to give gifts to the other members of the family and pay for a seven-day wedding party. As a result he would spend a lifetime paying off debts. In bin 'Abd al-Karim's eyes, this ran counter to the spirit of Islam which calls for economy and tolerance. To stop it, he decreed that the wedding party was to last for no more than three days and that extravagance must be avoided. To set an example, he fined and imprisoned people from his own tribe who broke this law.

¹⁴ Pennell, 62-80.

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Once tribunals had been set up in all the tribes, justice began to flourish and feuds became a thing of the past, since the very essence of feuding was lack of justice. The long reign of lawlessness and injustice was over. As a result the economy improved as well.

The economy of the Rif had suffered from the lack of political stability. But now that trade and markets were regulated economic life received an tremendous boost, and the standard of living of each household improved greatly. Hajj Omar gives a number of examples of the practical effects of this. People now started to buy meat every week on market day, rather than every other week as they had done before; men could afford to buy one djellaba and one pair of good quality slippers from Fez every year, not every two years; more houses, shops and business premises (such as oil-presses, water mills and so on) were built once bin 'Abd al-Karim had established his stable government. In Gzennaya alone, according to Hajj Omar, about eight flour mills and ten oil presses were constructed, an unprecedented figure in the history of the area.

Before the period of bin 'Abd al-Karim's leadership two issues, water rights, which for decades had been subject to no legal organisation, and questions of land-ownership, had caused disputes which led to some of the fiercest feuds of all. Now they were strictly regulated by a government official who was not only so well paid that he was beyond corruption, but was also answerable with his life and his property for any fighting in his area over land and water.

Jihad

For most informants, the name of bin 'Abd al-Karim is synonymous with *jihad*, the holy war. Oral history remembers him as the one and only holy war commander to raise *jihad* to its true position and give it true meaning. Indeed, many people believe that the most obvious manifestation of his *baraka* was the way he defeated the armies of two powerful colonial powers: France and Spain.

Of course, oral history has magnified the battles were magnified and at times blown them out of proportion in order to enhance their flavour of sanctity. No ordinary man could have won the battle of Annoual and that of Dhar Aberran because ordinary

men do not have the *baraka* of bin 'Abd al-Karim. In this context, *baraka* should be understood to mean military flair and the gift of commandship, even though at other times and in other places it refers to statecraft, diplomacy or leadership.

There is a literary problem here: how to make the chronicle of the battles as portentous for the listener as they were at the time they were happening. To get over it, informants used some interesting delivery techniques to enliven the narration of the oral history: the repetition of whole sentences over and over; the use of references to God, such as *allahu akbar* ("God is great"), *alhamdulillah* ("thanks to God"), or *ma-kbir yir llah* ("only God is great"); the repetitious use of onomatopaeic words, describing detonations and explosions for example; the use of theatrical effects; and the use of suspense.

Such techniques are generally used to gloss over truth, but in fact it turned out that the reports of the informants were very accurate: they were cross-examined and compared with reports of independent observers and those in Spanish and French archives.

For Si M'hammad Ben Si Abdeslam (72 years old in 1986), a farmer from Iharassen, bin 'Abd al-Karim's genius was best seen as a military strategist. One of his greatest achievements, he says, was the organisation of an army that was much more modern than any that the Sultan could raise, for all his money, influence and status. This army, like all modern armies, was disciplined and regimented. It is true that the backbone of this army was made up of men from bin 'Abd al-Karim's own tribe, the Aith Waryaghar. However, since rivalries ran deep even within tribes, leading to bloody feuds in the past, that alone was a tremendous achievement.

Si M'hammad argues that bin 'Abd al-Karim's extreme intelligence (*hinka*) and courage were undoubtedly his main advantages and must have been given by God to even the odds against the Rifis. Around July 1921 the Rifian army was estimated at about 6,000 men; the Spaniards had 25,000 in Melilla alone and the equivalent of 50,000 men elsewhere.¹⁵ But in a war

¹⁵ Woolman, 82, gives almost similar figures: "By the summer of 1921, the Rifians could count on approximately 3,000 to 6,000 fighting men - the pick of the Rif. The Spanish had more than four times that many soldiers in the Melilla *comandancia* alone, and another 45,000 in the Jibala."

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like this, he says, it is not men that count, but faith, faith in God and faith in justice, and dignity, and intelligence doubled with *baraka*.

In the French zone, General Lyautey had linked the eastern and western parts of his army in 1914 and by so doing crushed resistance in a pincer movement. In the Spanish zone, General Silvestre who took over as commanding general in the Comandancia General of Melilla in March 1920, tried to follow this example. He started to move the Spanish military machine forward in an effort to link Melilla by land to the islands of Nekor and Bades (respectively Alhucemas and Peñón de Vélez in Spanish): until then all communications had been by sea. General Silvestre had a lot of men at his disposal: 26,000 soldiers, 6,000 of them Moroccans of the *Regulares Marroquíes*, commanded by two generals and ten colonels. They were armed with 6,000 machine guns and 140 cannons and they had 20 trucks, 160 half-trucks and 5,400 horses and mules. The budget of this army was enormous: the Spanish treasury payed out 1000,000 pesetas a day.¹⁶ Between May 1920 and January 1921, this huge army moved forward, and a succession of posts fell into their hands: Dar Driouch in the Metalsa tribe, Tafersite in the Tafersite tribe, Azib Midar in Beni Touzine tribe, Souk Arbaa Beni Oulchik, Dar Kebdani and Jebel Mourad in Beni Said and Annoual in Tamsamane.¹⁷

The battles

Hajj Abdelkader Ben Si Abdeslam Alharrassi, a 77 year old retired Gzennaya tribal leader and notable, commented to me that most historians of the Rif war tend to forget that the victories of Dhar Aberrane and Annoual were the outcome of a long series of small battles and small victories in various places and even in different spheres: not only military, but also political and economic. These reached their climax in one of the biggest military defeats ever suffered by any colonial power, and one of the earliest too.

¹⁶ Kridia, 32, where he gives almost similar figures.

¹⁷ Cf. Kridia, 33.

Hajj Abdelkader describes how bin 'Abd al-Karim's military strategy was to play small and safe and to learn from every mistake. He was careful never to reveal his full military strength to the Spanish, in order to draw his enemy into a trap. The Spanish duly fell headlong into it.

The essence of his strategy, in fact, was to make use of the techniques of guerilla warfare. Bin 'Abd al-Karim had no intention of fighting a classical war with set-piece battles; instead he would send small groups of fighters, four or five men, behind enemy lines to carry out hit and run attacks. This technique proved remarkably effective: it sapped the morale of the enemy soldiers who were caught in a psychological war they were not trained to deal with.

Spanish units ran wild with rumours about Rifi fighters rising from the ground (from foxholes) to ambush the soldiers in the middle of the night. The Spaniards talked of an invisible enemy who was waging an unfair war against them: by "unfair" they meant a war not fought in the classical way. As his fighters gained a psychological advantage over his enemies, bin 'Abd al-Karim used their victories to rally more support to his cause. He had public criers announce his news in all the markets (*suqs*) of the Rif and imams narrated the victories and exploits of the *Amir al-Mujahidin*¹⁸ in all the Friday mosques.¹⁹

THE VICTORY OF DHAR ABERRANE

Hajj Abdelkader Ben Si Abdeslam says that bin 'Abd al-Karim always viewed the Annoual area as one of vital strategic importance. If the Spanish controlled it, that would threaten the independence of the Rif and especially that of his own tribe of Aith Waryaghar. By May 1921 he had come to believe that if another strategic point such as the hill of Dhar Aberrane fell into Spanish

¹⁸ *Amir al-Mujahidin*: the commander of holy fighters. Bin 'Abd al-Karim was given the title of *Amir* after the bay'a (the profession of the allegiance); however, he never pretended to the title of *Amir al-Muminin* - "Commander of the Faithful" which was the sole prerogative of the Sultan. See also Pennell, 125).

¹⁹ Congregational mosques in which a sermon is delivered every Friday prior to noon prayer.

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hands, that would be the end of his dream of an independent Rif. General Silvestre had come to the same conclusion: he realised that if he were to control Dhar Aberrane, other strategic areas such as Ras Tarf, Ras Shaib and Ras Buqquya would follow, and then the tribe of Buqquya itself, where the Spanish had a lot of allies. Then he would easily stifle the Aith Waryaghar and crush the Rif rebellion once and for all.

On 30 May 1921, Haj Abdelkader says, Silvestre consulted his allies from the tribes of the Gulf of Nekor.²⁰ On 21 June General Silvestre sent a contingent of 1,600 Rifi recruits²¹ to Dhar Aberrane: they took control of the hill in a matter of hours. They fortified it quickly and once this had been done the whole contingent, apart from a small garrison of about 350 men,²² returned to their base in Annoual. The Spanish press trumpeted this advance as a victory which marked the beginning of the great pacification of northern Morocco and the triumph of a civilised, organised and disciplined army, with a great past, against a horde of barbarian bandits.

The feeling of elation engendered by this quick and easy victory did not last long. In less than fifteen hours, bin 'Abd al-Karim counter-attacked²³; 300 *mujahidin* over-ran the position after a fierce battle in which the whole Spanish garrison was wiped out apart from a few dozen men who were allowed to go to Annoual unharmed to tell the others what happened and how well bin 'Abd al-Karim's men had fought.

The Rifi strategy during the battle conformed to all the obvious requirements of military planning and the struggle was fought in accordance with all the techniques of modern warfare. The contingent of *mujahidin* which was located in Jebel Kama was

²⁰ Kridia, 58, mentions the same date.

²¹ Ayache, 331, puts the contingent at 1,500 men.

²² Ayache, 331, mentions a group of 250 men: "...elle (la colonne) put, avant midi, se replier en ne laissant sur place que 250 hommes, la plupart marocains, avec, comme Espagnols, l'encadrement et les servants de quatre pièces d'artillerie."

Kridia, 58, reckons on 300 men.

²³ Muhammad Bin 'Azzuz Hakim, *Ma'rakat Anwal* (Rabat: Institution Abdelkhalek Torrès pour la Culture et la Pensée, 1981), 55, reports that bin 'Abd al-Karim in his memoirs argues that the battle for Dhar Aberrane was fought because of the hill's strategic importance.

divided into three groups; one was to the north of Aberrane, and one to the west; the job of these two groups was to fire at will to cover the advance of the third group that attacked from the east.²⁴

Bin 'Abd al-Karim's *baraka* was greatly enhanced by this battle. Not only had he vanquished a heavily armed colonial army in an impregnable position, but he had also sent tremors of fear through the structure of the Spanish protectorate. Last but not least, he took over a sizeable stock of armament, by courtesy of the Spanish Government: his army gained five cannons, 320 rifles, 65,000 ammunition rounds, in addition to tents, medicine, food and 12,000 pesetas in cash.²⁵

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Haj Abdelkader account makes it clear that the victory in Dhar Aberrane boosted the morale of the mujahidin. Its immediate consequence was that bin 'Abd al-Karim was recognised as the sole leader. In the long run, however, the military consequences were even more important than the political ones on the home front: this victory, he says, rallied all the tribes under the banner of the *amir*. By now bin 'Abd al-Karim was often being referred to as the "Amir bin 'Abd al-Karim." Tribes which until now had been cold towards or even opposed to the Rifi campaign against the "Christian

²⁴ Ayache, 331-32, describes this battle in the following terms: "Le demi-milien d'hommes dont ils étaient formés, se scinda en trois groupes dont deux postés sur des hauteurs à l'ouest et au nord d'Ouberrane couvriraient de leurs feux le troisième qui livrerait l'assaut par l'est. La mise en place effectuée discrètement, ils n'attaquèrent qu'après quinze heures, quand le repli du gros de l'adversaire n'eut laissé face à eux, que les seuls défenseurs restés en position. Mitraillés d'un côté et assaillis de l'autre, ceux-ci ne purent malgré l'usage de leurs obus fusants, briser la dernière vague qui déferla sur eux. A dix-sept heures, tout était terminé. Vingt artilleurs avaient pu s'échapper avec une cinquantaine de mercenaires rifains. Le reste, cent cinquante hommes et tous les officiers, était tué ou porté disparu."

²⁵ Bin cAzzuz Hakim, 49, reports that General Silvestre in his report put the loss of his army in weapons and equipment at 4 cannons, 360 rifles, 4 boxes containing 60,000 ammunition rounds as well as tents, medicine, and food.

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invaders" now joined in. This brought more recruits, more money and more logistic support.²⁶

As they moved on to Annoual, the most important enemy base in the whole country, bin 'Abd al-Karim's men won yet another victory. Ighriben is situated about 8 kilometres from Annoual and it had been fortified to serve as a forward post in the defence of the main base of Annoual. Even so, Ighriben fell too.

After Dhar Aberrane the Spanish were revengeful and bitter because their allies, bin 'Abd al-Karim's opponents, were either inefficient or had done nothing from fear of retribution in case bin 'Abd al-Karim won. The humiliated Silvestre promised to castrate all Rifi men and make sure that his soldiers get all the Rifi women pregnant.²⁷

The battle for Annoual was carefully planned and prepared by bin 'Abd al-Karim. His timing was perfect. He decided on an attack in July, after all the men had reaped and threshed their crops.

The battle itself happened so fast that it was over and the army wiped out before the Spanish leadership had recovered from its shock. The Spanish had almost 26,000 men in the area²⁸, and believed that the Rifis would never dare to attack so strong a base. When they did and Silvestre realised, after fierce fighting that his troops had lost, he ordered a retreat which turned into a rout.²⁹

²⁶ Ayache, 335.

²⁷ Pennell, 82, quotes PRO FO 371/7068/W9494/184/28, report by Atkinson received 5 September 1921, which relates a similar story according to which Silvestre promised that: "He would deprive the men of all reasonable expectation of becoming fathers while, as regards the women on the other hand, he would exact himself to the utmost to ensure that they became mothers."

²⁸ Pennell, 83, puts the number of Spanish troops in the area at 25,790 men.

²⁹ Pennell, 83-84 describes what happened in the following terms: "On the night of 21 July there were 4,000 troops in Anwal. From the hills surrounding the camp, the Rifis were firing down on them. The Spanish position was impossible. The next morning, Silvestre ordered the troops to withdraw on Issumar and Bin Tayyib. On the same day, General Navarro, his second-in-command, telegraphed Berenguer to say that Midar and Tafarsit were also under attack and could not be held. The Rifis had begun a general attack."

The battle of Annoual opened the flood-gate. Within almost no time the tribes of central Rif rose spontaneously against the Spanish and wiped them out in almost over a hundred battles. In two weeks the Rifis managed to recover all the places that Spain had taken thirteen years to conquer.

Spanish losses were estimated by several of my informants at 22,000 while the Rifis lost only 400 men. The supplies that the Spanish left behind after the battles provided the Rifis with 150 cannons, 25,000 rifles and ten million rounds of ammunition and grenades.³⁰

III. BIN 'ABD AL-KARIM IN ORAL LITERATURE

During the Rif War, poems and songs were as effective as weapons. The Gzennaya people say that in order to fight off the invading Spaniards bin 'Abd al-Karim used several means to rally the tribes under his banner, among them disinformation, propaganda, and poetry and song. During the war he called upon *imedyazen*³¹ to compose songs praising *jihad* and mujahidin and then sing them in the markets, at weddings and at parties in order to stir up the population and boost its morale.

The poem

One of the genres the most used in this campaign was the *raqsiyyat* (*rðqsiyyðθ*) poem. The word is derived from the Arabic word *qasida*, a well established literary genre which dates back to the pre-Islamic era.

Silvestre's retreat became a rout, in the course of which Silvestre himself was either killed or committed suicide. His body was never found. The troops who managed to reach Dar Druish rested for a few hours and then withdrew to Batil running across the burning plain of Garat in the summer heat harried all the way by the local people."

³⁰ Muhammad 'Alami, *za'im al-rif Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi* (Casablanca: Nashr al-Atlasi, 1969), 22, gives similar figures.

³¹ *Imedyazen* are itinerant singers.

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The *r̥qsiyyðθ* consists of a refrain which recurs after each stage of a two (or more)-rhymed couplet. As in pre-Islamic times it is often improvised in public. Frequently it starts with the choice of a tune, the composition of a refrain and then the rest of the poem.

Ahmed Ben Rahal, 28 years old, a poet himself, remembers a poem that generations of Rifis have sung and still sing in praise of bin 'Abd al-Karim:

The poem of the Rif³²

[We endured] too much suffering and too many hardships
[During] the war that took place down the river of Iharassen ³³

My words are carefully weighed and chosen,
Ben Abdelkrim never made a single step backwards.
He valiantly fought for his country day and night.
I [the poet] say this to you to reflect on,
Between us, let there be no treason.

We will fight for our country as long as we live,
May God help us and grant us patience.
The history of our country will be read by everyone,
Whether he is big or whether he is small.
To the sea we pushed the invading Spaniards.

As for the treacherous French they stabbed us in the back,
They broke our legs and would not let us stand up.
At the battle of Annoual we did not give him time to think,
Him and Spain we managed to vanquish.
Remember to vanquish your enemy attack him at dawn.

We gained independence and kicked out colonialism,
I will die for two things; my country and my sweetheart.
Take your rifle and get up early,
Take enough ammunition and go to the hill,
If you want to crush the treacherous people.

³² A Berber transcription of this poem is given at the end of the paper - Appendix 1.

³³ This is the refrain which is repeated after each stanza.

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In our flight we walked for miles and miles,
The very wounds of my heart are aching for my country.
God! O my God, the one and only, the conqueror,
Enough war! enough suffering,
The Gzennaya tribesmen have fought with great courage.

They fought the enemy in the rivers and in the streams,
Some died as holy warriors, others lost their limbs.
He whom we hit, dies immediately.
These holy warriors of the Rif, may God protect them,
They liberated every square inch of their country.

He who attacks them pays dearly for it.
These Rifis were brought up dauntlessly,
No race will ever beat them.
You! chant our glory by word of mouth; I, with a pipe.
The poem of our holy war is still long.

France erected buildings and left behind but ruins,
Let it be history, and let everyone read it.
We, as you know, have done what we could,
Now brother, it is up to you to carry on the fight.
Remember free people's heart will always light up.

In this poem, the *amedyaz* (poet and singer) is both a neutral narrator and a participant. As a narrator his role is to register history in the first stage and narrate it later on. He is allowed to exaggerate if it would have the effect of raising morale. But, he is not, under any circumstance, allowed to lie or distort the facts: if he does he loses the respect of his audience, which is tantamount to his failure in his work.

Haj Beqqich, 108 years old and *imam* of the Friday mosque of Ajdir in the Iharassen clan, recalls that during the Rif War the *imediyazen* used to go from market to market to sing poems such as the above. Often, before the *imediyazen* played, the Qaid³⁴ or his representative would read the latest news from the front. He can still remember the scene in Aknoul, in the southern Gzennaya well inside the old French zone of the Protectorate, in

³⁴ *caid*: head of local authorities and at the time of bin 'Abd al-Karim also a military commander.

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³³ This is the refrain which is repeated after each stanza.

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July 1924 when he heard the *imedyazen*. The head *amedyaz*³⁵ was standing in the middle of a circle of the spectators. In front of him were seated on the floor four musicians, two players of *zamar*³⁶ and two players of *aḡun*³⁷. The head *amedyaz* moved in a circle with a finger on his lips as a sign of silence before the beginning of the show. Then he jumped up in a theatrical way and stepped in the middle of the circle with the musicians at the ready. He began the show, in solo, with the following introductory frame:³⁸

In the name of God we begin,
In the name of God we say,
that Abdelkrim put an end
to the occupation of our land by Christians.

In the name of God we begin,
We will dance to the music of *zamar*
Ben Abdelkrim has always been,
O brother! a joyful man.

In the name of God we begin,
with good news,
there goes in the sky,
Ben Abdelkrim³⁹ with his valiant *Mahalla*⁴⁰.

The introductory frame, made up of rhymed couplets, often aims at preparing the audience for *r̥d̥q̥siyy̥d̥θ* which carries often several messages knitted meticulously around a central theme: in this case is holy war (*jihad*) against the invading Christians.

Poems, besides boosting morale and whipping up emotion were used to sing the praises of the fighters and celebrate their

³⁵ *amadyaz* is the singular form of *imedyazen*.

³⁶ *zamar*: a musical instrument consisting of two kinds of flutes strapped together and ending in separated horns.

³⁷ *aḡun*: tambourine.

³⁸ A Berber transcription is given in appendix 2.

³⁹ Bin 'Abd al-Karim, because of his unlimited *baraka*, was in the eyes of the Rifians a living saint able to work out miracles, so the poet in these introductory couplets considers him able to fly in the sky with his army.

⁴⁰ *Mahalla*: military task force. A Berber transcription of this poem is given at the end of the paper: Appendix 2.

victory. An example is the poem given below, celebrating the liberation of the city of Chechaouën which bin 'Abd al-Karim entered bare-headed and bare-footed as a sign of respect for its holiness.⁴¹

On to the war, off we go * We will come back home victorious
O friend ask history * It will inform you that we are the best victors
Congratulations, O city of Chaouen * For your liberation today
Be happy and be mercy * For escaping the grip of infidels
They left behind castles and buildings * And hurried in their defeat
Today the red flag is fluttering * High over the victors' heads
Congratulations to all of us * And praise to God
May God bless the faithful * And curse all the traitors

Later this poem became the lyrics of the National Anthem of the Republic of the Rif⁴² an abridged form of which follows:⁴³

On to the war, off we go * We will come back home victorious
O friend ask history * It will inform you that we are the best victors
We fought so many battles * And left the enemy baffled
They left behind castles and buildings * And hurried in their defeat
Today the red flag is fluttering * High over the victors' heads
Praise to God the Almighty * And curses to all the traitors

Henri Basset in his *Essai sur la littérature des berbères* reports the existence of such poems among other Berber tribes:

Il semble que de tels poèmes se récitent au cours
de veillées auxquelles se réunissent les hommes
dans la région du Drâ, pendant la courte période
froide de l'hiver.⁴⁴

Laoust makes the same point:

⁴¹ A transcription is given in appendix 3.

⁴² This abridged version is cited in Kridia, 79, and in Mohammed Hassan El Ouazzani, *Mudhakirat hayat wa-jihad* (Beirut, 1981), Volume 2, 455.

⁴³ A transcription is given in appendix 4.

⁴⁴ Henri Basset, *Essai sur la littérature des berbères* (Algiers: Bastide-Jourdan, 1920), 362.

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A l'occasion de cérémonies curieuses appelées *tinubqa*, de vrais bardes berbères récitent devant un peuple silencieux, les gestes des anciens peux. Ils célèbrent leurs exploits, ils chantent aussi la beauté et la vertu des femmes, ou vantent la puissance des igourramen des Tahouggat ou des Iguezouln, selon qu'ils appartiennent à l'un ou l'autre de ces lefs. . .⁴⁵

Finally, Moulieras points out that it is quite a common genre among the Banu Isnassan tribe in North-Eastern Morocco.⁴⁶

Izran, (rhymed couplets)

The *Izri* (plural *Izran*) is the most common poetical genre among the Berbers. *Izran* are used on a whole host of occasions: naming ceremonies, weddings, circumcisions, the celebrations of saints, reaping and threshing of crops, feuds, wars, and so on. They are often improvised on a tune that already exists which is suitable for the occasion.

Henri Basset describes them in the following terms:

Izli est un terme générique, employé dans bien des régions berbères, et qui sert à désigner toute pièce poétique courte, sur un sujet quelconque, faite ou non pour être chantée. C'est ainsi que nous avons vu les chants du Rif, composés à l'occasion de concerts s'appeler généralement *izlan*. Mais ici, nous restreindrons ce nom au sens qu'il a le plus souvent chez les populations berbères du Moyen-Atlas: celui de courte poésie, ou plutôt de courte phrase de prose rythmée, exprimant, sous une forme imagée, une pensée généralement assez simple; le plus souvent, elle

⁴⁵ Emile Laoust, *Etude sur le dialecte berbère des Ntifas* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1911), 322

⁴⁶ Auguste Moulieras, *Le Maroc inconnu*, Volume 1 *Exploration du Rif* (Paris and Algiers: Jourdan, 1895, 188-190.

n'est pas destinée à être chantée, mais récitée seulement, et sans accompagnement.

Ce genre poétique est essentiellement populaire. Si tels ou tels sont particulièrement doués, tout le monde, ou presque, compose des *izlan*, ou en a composé dans sa jeunesse. Les femmes y sont aussi habiles que les hommes, et parmi les *izlan* qui rencontrent le plus de succès, beaucoup sont leur oeuvre.⁴⁷

Izran have always been used in the Rif, as elsewhere, to sing the praise of saints, heroes and beautiful women and to curse enemies and traitors.

The following *izri*, the oldest on record, sings the praise of Sharif Sidi Muhammed Amizzyan who fought the invading Spaniards before bin 'Abd al-Karim. He was killed in an ambush in 1911.⁴⁸

Sidi Mohammed Amezzian,
is dead and we can't venerate his tomb.
Police and an army Captain have taken his body,
To the city to be photographed.
By God O Muh, the son of Messaoud,
Bring back his body so we can venerate him.

Biarnay reports the existence of an

Izri composé à l'occasion de la mort du Chérif Sidi Mohammed Amezzian, qui, après avoir organisé la résistance des Iq'rien contre les Espagnols, devint le Chef reconnu de la guerre sainte dans le Rif. Tombé dans une embuscade en 1911, avec une trentaine de ses compagnons, son corps ne fut pas retrouvé. Les Rifains supposèrent que les Espagnols avaient emporté son cadavre pour l'exposer dans leurs pays et le photographier(!). L'Autorité du Chérif passa à un

⁴⁷ Basset, 339-40.

⁴⁸ A transcription is given in appendix 5.

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de ses lieutenants Mouh', fils de Msâoud, auquel le chanteur demande de faire rendre le corps du chérif qui mourut en combattant pour l'indépendance du pays, afin que les honneurs auxquels il a droit lui soient rendus et que son tombeau vénéré devienne un lieu de pèlerinage.⁴⁹

Izran like *r̥oqsiyyðθ* are not simply poems: they also serve as a good record of history. In the following *izri*, the poet, during the time of bin 'Abd al-Karim, blames Jebel Hamam for all the troubles of the Rif. According to the poet, the Spaniards want to occupy the Rif at any cost because they have discovered silver in this mountain.⁵⁰

My son the Mount Hamam,
We can't get any peace.
Though your waters are cold,
and make trees grow.

This *izri* is also reported by Biarnay, who produces restates the explanation given by the poet:

...Dans l'esprit des Rifains, les Espagnols, qui, durant des siècles, n'ont pas cherché à sortir de leurs présidios, désireraient aujourd'hui faire la conquête du Rif, pour s'emparer de ses mines de métaux précieux. Une légende rifaine présente le Djebel Hamam, cité dans ce morceau, comme étant un énorme lingot d'argent. Ce trésor aurait été, de tous temps, convoité par les Européens. Une garde de trente hommes en empêche, dit-on, l'accès aux étrangers depuis qu'un aventurier, au XVIII^e siècle, désigné dans la légende sous le nom de "Condé", en aurait fait la découverte. Les

⁴⁹ S. Biarnay, *Etude sur les dialectes berbères du Rif* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1917), 355-56.

⁵⁰ A transcription is given in appendix 6.

gens du pays semblent reprocher au Djebel Hamam d'être le motif pour lequel leur paix est troublée. Ils craignent, disent-ils, qu'il ne soit bientôt la cause de la perte de leur indépendance.⁵¹

Izran have a number of features which make them particularly effective in recording the history of the Rif. They are short, easily memorised, can be quickly spread from mouth to mouth, and they can be sung to any tune. Moreover they are not just an "art-form" - they have practical uses: if needs be they can be used to transmit messages, or serve as passwords. Most of all they are popular because they express feelings and experiences which are widely shared.

In the following *izri*, the poet/fighter is on his way to the front to do his duty. He stops by the house of his beloved to bid her farewell in very moving terms because he might not come back:

Good-bye O dearest one,
I am on my way to fight for you and my land.⁵²

Before he leaves for the battlefield, he asks his beloved for a favour, probably her last to him:

sing *ralla-buya*⁵³ sister, sing it loud,
I will fight the Spaniards until I go to sleep (die).

When he reached the front the poet is injured in his hand, but instead of going home, chooses to serve alongside his

⁵¹ Ibid., 354-55.

⁵² In another version of the same *izri*, the poet stops by the shrine of his local patron saint to ask him for his blessing on his undertaking. He does this by entering the shrine bare-footed and hatless and unarmed, prays and then kisses the four corners of the tomb of the saint:

Good-bye O my patron saint,
I am on my way to fight for my country.

⁵³ *ralla-buya* is a very popular kind of *izran* proper to the Rif in which the catchphrase is repeated in every other rhymed couplet.

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tribesmen as a messenger. In this *izri*, the country and the beloved are indivisible and the poet addresses them both.

Then the poet invokes the *baraka* of patron saint of his locality or perhaps of a regional patron like Sidi Sha'ib u-Neftah:

Sidi Chaib u-Neftah, the saint with two bullets
one for the Spanish, one for the traitors⁵⁴

A glimpse here of what happened to traitors during the Rif War: they were shot.

The poem continues with the defeat of the Spanish army at Annoual. They decide to leave but they are bitter because they cannot bear the idea that they have been kicked out:

The Spaniards are crying, may they cry their eyes out,
They are crying over the olive trees they have planted
with their own hands.⁵⁵

The olive tree is the symbol of peace and 'pacification' which took the Spaniards and the French years to achieve. But it was so fragile that the Moroccan fighters shattered it in a few weeks only.

Finally the poet-fighter alludes to the defeat of bin 'Abd al-Karim. This he explains by the collusion of Spain and France which realised the threat that he posed to their colonial interests:

⁵⁴ Again, these lines echo those of another *izri*:

Sidi Chaib u-Neftah, the saint with two doors,
One for *izran*, one for *ralla-buya*.

Sidi Chaib u-Neftah, is the patron saint of all *imedyazen* and artists. The story has it that *imedyazen* in order to become such, have to go to the saint tomb, make a sacrifice, and spend the night inside the shrine with the musical instrument they would want to master. In their sleep, the saint comes to them and endows them with a the gift of singing *izran* or *ralla-buya* and/or playing musical instruments.

⁵⁵ Another version of the same *izri* reads as follows:

The Spaniards have left, they are crying over their colony,
They are crying over the loss of the olive trees they have
planted with their own hands.

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The Spanish, the enemy and the French the treacherous woke up,
and they are fighting the holy fighter of the Rif with bullets and hands.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown how the oral tradition of the tribe of Gzennaya reported the rise of bin 'Abd al-Karim in the Rif and the poetical genres which were used to record his war against the Spanish between 1921 and 1926. Thus there are two aspects to the oral tradition: history and literature.

Only by dealing with these two aspects together can we appreciate the importance of the oral traditions. Because they formed part of a traditional way of expression, part a corpus of epic poems and *izran*, the examples we have looked at here were at one with traditional Rifi society as a whole. However, oral literature was not simply a means of literary expression, it also served an immediate political purpose as part of the propaganda machine which swung support behind the radically new regime of bin 'Abd al-Karim. It was *because* these poems were part of the traditional social culture of the Rif that they served the purposes of the new political culture so well. That is why they were important at the time.

They are also important now, in another way. They are not only part of the history of the Rif war, but they also throw light on that history. Written Rifi primary sources on the history of the war are few in number.⁵⁷ That is why oral sources are so important: they give a Rifi point of view to the rise of bin 'Abd al-Karim. They show the importance of his personal charisma. They demonstrate what his *baraka* was founded upon - the mixture of his intelligence and success in battle with his religious legitimacy, derived in part from a local belief in his descent from the Prophet

⁵⁶ The holy fighter of the Rif is, of course, bin 'Abd al-Karim. In this context "hands" means hand-held weapons, or knives.

⁵⁷ The best-known written Rifi account is the memoirs of Muhammad Azarqan, bin 'Abd al-Karim's Minister of Foreign Affairs, recorded by Ahmad Skiraj, "al-zall al-warif fi mukhabara al-Rif, 'am 1443-1924 [sic]," manuscript in Archives Nationales, Rabat

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and in part from his restoration of order and Islamic law. These are matters of perception, so difficult to capture in written sources in any society. Then there are the accounts that oral traditions give of events, particularly of the course of battles. It is here that the examination of these oral traditions in particular helps to answer one of the problems of dealing with oral literature in general. Of course it may be biased and clouded by the passage of time. But the accounts of battles in the Rif War often do check out against the written sources of the European participants, so that the two sources help to validate the general outlines of each other. Such a picture is impossible to obtain using written sources alone.

Appendix 1.

rəqsiyyəθ nārif

məšhar ədrəmhayən, məšhar ədəəb
iyzā iharassən ɔni giwqəθ dərhab.

qandəšš awar inu sərmizan ədrəbə,
qaban ɛbəddəkrim wa yəqib ya dərfa.
ikafəθ xədməθ inas am ɣirəθ am ɔnnhə,
nəššəqqāy manaya šəkk ɔfhəm u fəkkā,
imma nəššin žarandə waytiri rəyda.

ankafəθ xədməθənnəy man yandə nəddā,
abbi adax ɛawən awadəx yak^uš əssbə,
attarix mədməθənnəy aqa kulši aθiyā,
amaməš ma yəgga daməzyan niy yəmyā.
aspanyu ayddā nəssiwəθ ya rəbhā.

amšuma ɣəwfransis nətta rəbda iyəddā,
iyəddərandə ifaddən wəxayizzi andkkā.
agg^u anwar wadasnəzzi dərwdxt adifəkkā,
nətta ɔspanyu nəqdasən dərde mā,
qandətta rədu əbnaədm asibəkkā.

nəwwid rəstiqrar məssufəy rəstie mā,
qandəšš ɔtmətti y xārif dəsšək arde mā.
ksi ləklata dəkkaəθ dərɔfzā
ksi aqātas dəryəθ ya wədrā,
mara daxsəda ləqəθ xəbnaədm ayədda.

məʃhar inuɣ'o, məʃhar inhaʒʒā,
urinu yəʃməð xəðmoθ inu yəɛdā.
arəbbi asiði ya wahit ya qəhhā,
məʃhar ɔɔrbarud, məʃhar ɔaməndā,
ig'zənnayəɔn ʒahəɔn sənnəʒ irmiqəɔ.

wəʒʒim ɔasəɣya wəʒʒin awa iɣā,
ʃa yammuuθ ɔamʒahəð ʃa yəmməksas uɔā,
aqa wənni ɣandwwəθ ɔntiʃʃast xuynā,
imʒahəɔnna bārif ābbi aθnissā,
hārānd ɔammoθ ɔnsəɔn wəʒʒin ura ɔəʃʃbā.

wan xasəɔn itəɔddan asəɣ'əɔn ma ktta.
imʃuməɔn nəryafa xərqəɔn ɔi rəwəā,
hatta ʃa nərgəɔns wəɔasəɔn izəmmā.
ʃəkk inid sugəmmum nəʃʃ səzzamā,
rəqsittəθ nərzihəɔ nəttaθ ɛaɔ ɔəmmɣā.

ɔfrəɔss qa ɔəbna ɔəʒʒa ɣa rəswā,
əttarix nətta qaɔwa iwəɔn ixisəɔn aθiɣɣā,
nəʃʃin nəɣ'a mayəmmi ɔnzəmmā,
imma ʃəkk ayuma imma ruxa ɔəbbā,
əbnaəɔm əhori urinɔs əɔinəwwā.

Appendix 2

bismillah anəbɔa
bismillah anini
qa ɛəbɔəkrim yəqɔa
əxrəmə urumi

bismillah anəbɔa
səzzamā andʃəh
qa ɛəbɔəkrim rəqɔa
nətta ayuma yənnəʃrəh

bismillah anəbɔa
əswawar ifərhəɔn
ɛəbɔəkrim əgɣ'zəɔnna
əsrəmhəɣɣəθ isəbhəɔn

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Appendix 3

°alyawma hayyū lilhurūbi hayyū * wa naržieu lilbalad ḡāfirīnā
°aqa°ilan sali °attarixa yumli * bi°anana nahnu xayru °annāsirīnā
°amadinatu °aššāwn bušrā * daxalaki °annasru wa °assa°du °aθθamina
faṭībī nafsān wa qurṛī °aynan * qadd nažawti mina °alqawmi °alkāfirīnā
kam tarakū min qusūrin wa binā°in * wa inqalabu xāsi°ina xasirīnā
wa °alyawma °arrayatu °alhamra°i tasmu * wa turafrifu °ala °alfa°izīnā
hani°an lanā fawzan žami°an * wa °alḡamdu lillah rabbu °al°alamīnā
wa yarḡamu °allahu °almu°minīnā * wa yan°alu °allahu °alxa°nīnā

Appendix 4

°alyawma hayyū lilhurūbi hayyū * wa naržieu lilbalad ḡāfirīnā
°aqa°ilan sali °attarixa yumli * bi°anana nahnu xayru °annāsirīnā
kamm šayyōrna min buhūrin wa dima°in * wa tarakna al°a°ādi ha°irīnā
kamm tarakū min qusūrin wa binā°in * wa °inqalabu xāsi°in xasirīnā
wa lyawma arrayatu °alhamra°i tasmu * wa turafrifu °ala °alfa°izīnā
wa °alḡamdu lillah rabbu °al°alamīn * wa la°natu °allah °ala °alxa°nīnā

Appendix 5

siḡi muḡammaḡḡ amḡžyan
yḡmmuḡ waḡḡnšḡhā.
iksiḡ apulis ḡuqḡbtan
ya rḡmḡum aḡiḡḡwwā.
ḡllah ḡllah amuḡ ḡnmḡsḡuḡ,
āriḡiḡ ḡhma aḡḡnšḡhā.

Appendix 6.

mḡmmi aḡra uḡammam,
mḡmmi wanufi rḡhna.
aman ḡiḡḡmmaḡḡn,
aman ḡiḡḡmmaḡḡn,
ḡssḡrḡahḡn ḡaḡstḡa.

Appendix 7

ðllah itahðnnak amami lðeziz inu,
aðahay aðžahððy xam ðttmoθ inu.

[the variant noted in footnote 52 is
ðllah itahðnnak a siði ðššix inu,
aðrahðy aðžahððy ðxðammoθ inu.]

inid ralla buya awaðēma maša āni ðayðs,
aððk"θðy aspanyu armani yayawi iððs.

qðssðy fus inu ði rðbēað iððwðan,
ðššðm iðayi yižžin taryðy agiðzran.

siði ðš'ayðb unðftah buðnayðn iqatāðn,
yðžžðn uspanyu yðžžðn iððkkamðn.

[the variant noted in footnote 54 is
siði ðš'ayðb unðftah buðnayðn ðndðwura,
yðštðn ηizran yðštðn ðnralla buya.]

yðttru uspanyu, aðiru ðxrðēma inðs,
yðttru xðzzitun yðzzu sufus inðs.

aspanyu yðffðy yðttru ðxrðēma inðs,
yðttru xðzzitun yāra sufus inðs.

aspanyu ræðu ðufransis amšum zðggiððs faqðn,
aššaθðn māra amžahðð nārif suqātðs ðifassðn.

PHONETIC TRANSCRIPTION TABLE

w	bilabial glide
θ	voiceless interdental fricative
ð	voiced interdental fricative
š	voiceless palato-alveolar fricative
ž	voiced palato-alveolar fricative
k	voiceless palatal fricative
g ^y	voiced palatal fricative
y	palatal glide
η	velar nasal
q	voiceless uvular plosive
x	voiceless uvular fricative
ɣ	voiced uvular fricative

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°	glottal stop
h	voiceless pharyngeal fricative
ɛ	voiced pharyngeal fricative
č	voiceless alveopalatal affricate
ǧ	voiced alveopalatal affricate
i	front unrounded high vowel
ī	long counterpart of the above (i.e. i)
e	front unrounded mid-high vowel
a	central unrounded low vowel
ā	long counterpart of the above (i.e. a)
ə	central unrounded vowel
u	back unrounded vowel
o	back unrounded vowel

Pharyngealization (emphasis) is represented by the pharyngealized segment
- e.g.: t̤ d̤ s̤ etc.